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1. INTRODUCTION 
The smuggling of cigarettes has been the focus of a number of journalistic and 
academic accounts and official reports throughout the world, and has been intertwined 
with other criminal activities, terrorism
2
, health
3
, minority ethnic groups
4
, and 
finance. It is estimated that smuggled cigarettes account for 6-8.5% of the total 
cigarette consumption
5
, and that for every truckload of cigarettes smuggled into the 
EU US$ 1,2 million (about £ 691,000/EURO 992,000) in taxes are lost.
6
 According to 
EUROPOL
7
, countries with high taxation on cigarettes are vulnerable to cigarette 
smuggling however, very interestingly cigarette smuggling may be more prevalent in 
countries in which cigarettes are cheaper
8
. Spain and Italy for instance, that are two 
countries of the EU associated with large-scale cigarette smuggling for several 
decades now.
9
 Greece is a source, transit and destination country for smuggled 
cigarettes, as well as a country with relatively cheap cigarettes. According to official 
figures obtained by the Hellenic Coast Guard, in the period 2000-2004 there were 
39,941,392 packs of cigarettes seized and the evaded taxes were exceeding EURO 
107 million.
10
 In addition, it should be noted that Greece is the top smoking country 
worldwide in terms of per capita cigarette consumption as well as a country with a 
relatively large population of smokers that reaches 40% of the population.
11
 
The above have to be viewed within the context of the low „tax consciousness‟ 
among the Greek public, that is believing that the state is a repressive mechanism that 
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takes a significant part of their income
12
, as well as the fact that the informal economy 
in the country that accounts for up to 30 per cent of the GDP, is the largest informal 
economy in Europe
13
. Consequently, there may be a case that cigarette smuggling is 
supported not only by the smokers, who buy black market cigarettes but also 
supported „morally‟ by the smoking population. Finally, it is the „treatment‟ cigarette 
smuggling, and especially street-selling of smuggled cigarettes, receives from the 
police.  It is suggested that there is a tolerant environment to cigarette smuggling in 
Greece that, in contrast to other contexts and commodities‟ trades (e.g., cocaine 
trafficking in the Netherlands, see Zaitch, 2002
14
), refers to both the general climate to 
the particular trade and law enforcement. For all the above, Greece is an important 
context for the study of cigarette smuggling. The topic however, has been relatively 
neglected by the academic community, as we only have a superficial account of 
cigarette smuggling – among other criminal activities – by Albanian organised crime 
groups in Greece
15
, and a small account of the phenomenon in a general textbook on 
tobacco and smoking
16
. 
According to Joossens
17
, there are basically two ways of smuggling large 
quantities of cigarettes: a) bootlegging: buying an amount of cigarettes that exceeds 
custom regulations, and b) large-scale smuggling. Von Lampe
18
 comes to add another 
way of supplying cigarettes to the black market, namely counterfeiting. In this study 
the focus is on the second way of smuggling, and this article intends to provide a 
detailed case study of a cigarette smuggling network operating in Greece. Case 
studies have been used in other projects to throw light onto the structure and workings 
of „organised‟ crime such as this by Natarajan19 and Pearson and Hobbs20. The aim of 
the study is broken down into four objectives:  
1. to provide an account of the structure of the particular network,  
2. to provide a description of the „actors‟ involved in the particular network, 
3. to provide an account of the ways the particular network obtains and stores  
smuggled cigarettes, and finally 
4. to provide an account of the introduction of smuggled cigarettes into the 
market and their distribution by the particular network. 
In this article we are not in the position to provide an account of the social 
organisation of the cigarette smuggling business in the country, as we do not possess 
such a large amount of information. What we do however, is to provide information 
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on the social organisation of a smuggling network, which our informants were 
involved in 2002 and 2003, and have knowledge of.  
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Researching organised crime is a potentially risky endeavour. Thus 
researchers usually use official data, which – although they are extremely valuable – 
they do not provide an integrated approach to the topic
21
 as they „ignore‟ the “reality 
of the offenders”22. In this study a strategy other than the official data has been 
utilised. This paper is the product of a series of interviews with three retired Kurdish 
cigarette smugglers. These individuals included 1 pusher and 2 street-sellers (we 
provide a detailed account of what a pusher and a street-seller are at a later stage). 
Through contacts we initially met the pusher, who then led us to the two street-sellers, 
who had worked for him when in Greece. These interviews, which were conducted in 
a series of occasions and as free-flowing conversations with the participants between 
September 2004 and December 2004, are part of an ethnographic study with the 
Kurdish community in a town of the North-East of England. The ethnographic study 
did not start with the aim of identifying the social organisation features of a cigarette 
smuggling network but those of migrant smuggling.  
This paper is only a part of the ethnographic study, and some other data and 
information from this research have been used in accounts of migrants smuggling
23
. 
The interviews for the current study were almost exclusively conducted in Greek, and 
this was due to the participants‟ extended (illegal) residence in Greece.  
The validity of the participants‟ accounts is an issue that warrants at least a 
comment. There may be instances in which participants exaggerate and glorify their 
deeds or instances in which there are unclear accounts. We attempted to prevent 
invalid accounts on the part of the participants by many times repeating questions 
over the course of the particular research, and by verifying accounts against those of 
the other „members‟/nodes of the cigarette smuggling network. During this cross-
referencing process the degree of details was such as to allow us to accept the 
accounts as valid.       
 
 
3. THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF THE CIGARETTE SMUGGLING 
NETWORK 
 
3.1 Structure of the cigarette smuggling network 
 
References in the Greek media to the Mafia and/or the Cartel
24
 when it comes 
to organised criminal activities including the smuggling of cigarettes creates the 
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impression that this enterprise (as well as other illegal enterprises) is controlled by 
strong, closed, rigid, hierarchical, and extremely powerful Mafia-type organisations. 
This representation, although it is beneficial to law enforcement and the state
25
 and 
to the media themselves due to the attractiveness of an issue/entity like the Mafia
26
, 
is to a large extent a misunderstanding.
27
 Contrary to this misrepresentation, the 
important term/structure/entity here is the network. Networks are fluid thus easily 
adaptable to the new operational environments
28
 and forms of social control
29
. 
Networks may not be static but, in our opinion, neither they continuously change nor 
are they perpetually fluid
30
.  
In this study, although specific groups within the network are ethnically 
homogeneous, the particular network is ethnically heterogeneous. This contributes to 
the flexibility of the network. As Pearson and Hobbs suggest, “too much reliance on 
[the] …more traditional forms of trust relation can become a liability, since an 
exclusive dependence on embedded ties can trap the firm in a closed network that 
would inevitably choke itself”.31 Of course, Greeks are also heavily involved in the 
workings of the network in a variety of ways as we shall show at a later stage. The 
cigarette smuggling network is composed of smaller local smuggling „groups‟ and/or 
individuals that operate in cooperation (and sometimes in competition), and connect 
to each other through individuals, who are reciprocally linked in some way or 
another
32
, strongly or weakly, to more than one individuals and groups
33
. Although 
the global implications of cigarette smuggling, and organised crime in general, are 
clear
34
 these groups largely operate on a local/regional level. As Hobbs has noted, 
“networks are the media through which …groups move between the local and the 
global”.35  
Technological advancements, and specifically mobile phones, contribute to the 
regular communication between individuals and consequently between groups and 
networks, and the possible expansion of the network
36
. All participants in the current 
study, for instance, had more than one mobile phones, one of which was specifically 
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used for „business‟. Their business phone number was known only by other people 
involved in the business or by (known) customers.  
There are three levels in the actual cigarette smuggling network that are 
identified in this study, similar to those identified by von Lampe
37
: Upper level, 
middle level, and street level. But as will be shown later in this paper there are some 
„nodes‟ of the network that cannot be categorised in any of the levels really primarily 
because of the nature of their activities in relation to the cigarette smuggling business 
(e.g., corrupt public officials). 
Within the context described above, there is a division of duties, although many 
times the duties that each member has to carry out may change. There is also a case, 
just as with other trades (e.g. migrant smuggling)
38
 in which a member of a 
smuggling group may have more than one duty. However, there are some „roles‟ 
within each group that remain stable over time:  
a) Wholesaler: The wholesaler has a „managerial‟ position in the whole business. In 
this case study the wholesaler is a Russian with a number of legitimate businesses 
in the country, Russia and Germany, and with connections in the country of 
production of cigarettes, transit countries as well as Greece. The particular 
Russian has very successfully invested money obtained from illicit trades 
involving cigarette smuggling into legitimate businesses in the aforementioned 
countries. In this network the wholesaler acts as the „leader‟ of the network. 
However, the fact that there is a „leader‟ does not of course mean that 
“conspiracies and mega-hierarchies”39 exist. The particular Russian wholesaler is 
nothing near a Godfather-like figure. 
b) Procurers: The procurers in this network are primarily Greeks owning legitimate 
businesses, who buy large quantities of cigarettes from Greek tobacco companies 
with the intention to export and sell them in Bulgaria, and then forward it (wholly 
or partly) to the wholesaler and/or the pusher. Non-Greek procurers, strongly tied 
to the wholesaler only, residing in countries other than Greece, and specifically 
countries of the former Soviet Union, are also present. It is hypothesised that they 
are some of the links between the network presented in this study and other 
networks. 
c) Pushers: These are individuals who are known to the wholesaler and (some of) 
the Greek procurers, they are considered trustworthy, and have the responsibility 
of introducing the smuggled cigarettes to the market. van Duyne
40
 refers to these 
individuals as the intermediaries. Some pushers do not know of other pushers. 
Some however, may have a very close relationship. For instance, one of the 
evenings spent with one of the participants another pusher, a Russian one 
currently working in Greece, gave him a call and had a quite lengthy and warm 
phone chat (in Greek). They would both send gifts to each other in the form of 
cigarettes, money, house ornaments etc. It is not an essential requirement for the 
pusher to have been previously involved in a „managerial‟ position in some other 
smuggling business, although the Kurdish pusher interviewed was involved in the 
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smuggling of video-cassettes from Iraq into Iran in the 1990s. However, the 
pushers usually start as street-sellers and, based on their abilities to manage and 
sell large quantities of cigarettes as well as on contacts, possibilities of upward 
mobility within the network/market appear. For instance, another pusher in the 
particular network was working as a street-seller for 4 months before he was 
given the opportunity to climb the ladder of the cigarette smuggling business.  
d) Street-sellers. These are individuals primarily drawn from the migrant 
community in the country, which serves as a reliable pool for low level 
employees in illicit markets
41
. The vast majority of the street-sellers of the 
particular network examined come from the community of migrants from the 
former Soviet Union (e.g., Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, and Armenian 
migrants), including a number of middle-age women. There is also a number of 
Kurdish street-sellers. The reason for this is that the second-level cigarette 
smugglers identified in this network, the pushers, are of Soviet and Kurdish 
background, who employ people of the same ethnic origin, because of the 
features like common language, culture and experiences that results in a smoother 
working of the network. As Lupsha
42
 suggests “if a group speaks the same 
language, has the same village roots, possesses the same myths and cultural 
norms then it can function as a unit with greater trust and understanding”. This 
does not mean, of course, that there are strong ethnic tights/seals in the network. 
In some instances street-sellers of ethnic origin other than Soviet and Kurdish are 
employed (e.g., Bulgarians, Romanians, and Albanians), and it is not uncommon 
for Greeks, primarily Greek Roma to be involved in street selling. Each pusher 
employs about 10-15 street-sellers at any given time, who are paid about EURO 
30 a day irrespectively of the sells. The Kurdish pusher often changes workers. 
Street-sellers of Kurdish origin are „recycled‟ in a high rate. This is inevitable, 
not due to any criminal justice variables, but because the vast majority of Kurdish 
migrants are highly mobile, as they view Greece primarily as a transit country to 
countries of western Europe
43
; and particularly the United Kingdom and 
Germany being the main destination countries. Despite the fact that Kurdish 
migrants are involved in cigarette smuggling, and especially the highly visible 
street-level smuggling, official reports totally ignore their involvement in this 
trade.
44
  
e) Scouters/Look-Outs: Scouters/look-outs are basically in-and-around the areas in 
which the street-selling of smuggled cigarettes takes place. They are there to 
warn/alert street-sellers about the presence of the police in the area, and 
especially known (to them) non-uniformed police. In respect to the Kurdish part 
of the network described in this study, it is worth noting that because the word 
police is pronounced in the same in Kurdish, the word used by the scouters/look-
outs to warn the street-sellers is pakhla, which literally refers to a form of a 
traditional Kurdish food. This brings in mind the phrase people in the deprived 
areas in Bourgois‟ research45 use for police patrol cars, namely ugly cars.   
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f) The „House Guards‟: The „house guards‟ have the responsibility of guarding the 
houses, rooms, etc. at the central business district and transitional zone in Athens 
(usually) rented by the pushers or by Greeks connected in any way with the 
pushers (e.g., wives and/or girlfriends) that used as storing places for boxes with 
cigarettes before they are distributed to the street-sellers or sold to some 
customers directly. The house guards may be recruited specifically for this task 
but the author came across Kurdish migrants who have no accommodation, and 
they are provided a place to stay under the requirement to watch the merchandise, 
and open the door to known street-sellers only. House guards are also paid about 
EURO 30 a day. The „house guards‟, as well as the street-sellers and the 
scouters/look-out are recruited from the migrant community since they are 
socially and very importantly economically marginalised. As one of the 
informants suggested in relation to the Kurdish people involved in the trade: 
 
“When Kurdish people come to Greece they have no job, they have no money, 
they have nothing… when I give them some work with cigarettes I help them. It is 
a big help you know…”.  
 
g) Legitimate shop owners: They are almost exclusively Greeks, who own a shop in 
or around the street-selling area and „operate‟ as a quick „refuelling‟ point for 
street-sellers and/or a place of quickly „hiding‟ the smuggled cigarettes when 
police are very close to the street-selling point.  
h) Thieves/Burglars: Thieves and burglars participating in this network are 
„professionals‟, who feed the pushers with cigarettes they steal from large 
warehouses of cigarettes destined for the legal cigarette market. Technically they 
do a job similar to the procurers but with a much smaller frequency. They are 
usually drawn from the migrant community from the former Soviet Union, and 
they are strongly tied with the Russian pushers. As the informants suggested there 
were three groups in Menidi, in the greater Athens area, that were doing this job 
in the early 2000s. 
i) Drivers/Captains: As reported by the participants, the drivers and captains of 
ships have the responsibility of transporting quantities of cigarettes into Greece. 
They are usually individuals employed legally as truck drivers and/or captains 
and either transport cigarettes as the main product or concealed in their legal 
merchandise. The truck drivers are Greeks whereas the captains tend to come 
from Greece, Russia and Ukraine.    
j) „Protectors‟: These are individuals, who engage in the protection of the interests 
of the cigarette smuggling business from Albanian and Russian extortion gangs. 
In the current research the author did not come across any protectors coming 
from the Kurdish community but from the community of migrants from the 
former Soviet Union. It is not that the Kurdish street-sellers are not in need of 
some form of protection against extortion and/or robbery. Quite the opposite; 
however, a large number of Kurdish migrants residing (and hanging around) in 
these areas of the city where street-level cigarette smuggling takes place, and the 
strong relationship between the members of the Kurdish community, make 
intervention by Kurdish bystanders almost certain. Many times there are fights 
among groups from the former Soviet Union with conflicting interests (not only 
cigarette-related) in areas such as Menidi, a suburb of Athens, where not only is 
there a high concentration of migrants from the former Soviet Union but also 
places for the storing of large quantities of cigarettes. While fighting in the area 
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of street-selling is extremely infrequent, it does happen from time to time. It is 
hypothesised that the general absence of fighting at the street-selling is usually 
the result of the reluctance on the part of the actors of the network to attract 
police attention and jeopardise the market. The „protectors‟ are nodes of the 
network that are not affected by the dynamics of the illegal market per se.
46
 They, 
and violence in general, have a peripheral role in the actual cigarette smuggling 
business. In relation to this Hobbs
47
 has argued the dominating force for such 
businesses to be the market “rather than some cosy, familiar macho world of hard 
men … ”. Nevertheless, the „protectors‟ are an integral part of the whole picture. 
k) Corrupt public officials: The corrupt public official “is a vital node in the 
criminal network”48, and the cigarette smuggling network presented in this article 
is, of course, no exception. There were numerous references to customs officers 
employed in the borders with Bulgaria, who were bribed to allow for the 
importation of smuggled cigarettes in the country (among other „commodities‟). 
In addition, the participants in this research verified in numerous instances that 
police officers and coast guards were bribed primarily to „turn a blind eye‟ to 
allowing storing places for large quantities of smuggled cigarettes to exist or 
when coming across larger quantities of smuggled cigarettes by sea. On the 
street-level however, police officers were not bribed to „turn a blind eye‟ to the 
distribution of cigarettes because, as noted earlier, the police were very tolerant to 
the illegal cigarette street market. In fact, on the street-level corrupt police 
officers were exploiting their position to exert amounts of money from street-
sellers.          
The whole network described in this study is graphically presented in Figure 1. 
Because, apart from nodes, networks are also about ties, the author will attempt to 
provide graphically and tentatively the strength of ties between the nodes (actors) in 
this network. In this attempt he adopts Granovetter‟s49 view, namely that the strength 
of ties depends on intimacy and nature of interaction, emotional intensity, time spent 
and exchange of services among „members‟ of a network or a combination of all the 
above. The reader should also be aware however, that each node does not have the 
quantity of one actor.    
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Figure 1. Structure of the Cigarette Smuggling Network 
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier the Wholesaler acts as the „leader‟ of the particular 
network in the sense that the whole network evolves around him. The Wholesaler has 
strong ties with the Procurers, who provide large quantities of cigarettes and the Truck 
Drivers/Captains, who have the responsibility of transporting these quantities. He also 
has strong ties with the Pushers, who are responsible for introducing the merchandise 
into the market. On the other hand the ties between the Wholesaler and the Corrupt 
Public Officials are not strong, they are not continuous, they are sporadic, and serve 
as a lubricant for the workings of the market at all levels of cigarette smuggling. 
Consequently, the Corrupt Public Officials are also weakly tied to the Procurers, the 
Pushers, and the Street-Sellers as well as the Truck Drivers/Captains. Some Pushers 
have strong ties with other Pushers; however, this is not always the case. All Pushers 
are strongly tied to the Street-Sellers they work with. Moreover, the Russian Pushers 
are strongly tied to the Thieves/Burglars, weakly tied to the Protectors and the Look 
Outs/Scouters, and the Pushers (including the participants of this study) are weakly 
tied to the Look Outs/Scouters and the Shop-Owners, and strongly tied with the 
House Guards. Finally, the Street-Sellers are weakly tied to the Shop Owners, the 
House Guards, and the Look Outs/Scouters.   
It should be noted that strong and weak ties in this figure generally refer to 
market/business and not personal, ethnic or other ties. As it is obvious in this figure 
some lines extent but do not link to any actors. This is to show that the network 
presented in this article may be linked to other network(s) “through particular actors, 
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who serve as „bridges‟”50. These networks are however, beyond the scope of this 
study. The fact that some individuals are weakly linked to other individuals within 
this network does not, of course, mean that they are not important. Coles, citing his 
thoughts on Granovetter‟s article, suggests “it is those individuals, who have weak 
ties to others in other groups, who provide the links for the chains along which 
information can pass”51. 
The recruitment of members for this cigarette smuggling network is an 
extremely interesting feature. The particular network has evolved around the 
wholesaler. On the level of the pusher, membership is tightly restricted and depends 
either on contacts and on previously presented „credentials‟ and experience or on 
trust. The first of the informants, who worked as a pusher in the particular cigarette 
smuggling network, was recruited by one of the Russian pushers involved in the 
network. It is hypothesised that this recruitment was a way for the Russian pusher to 
exploit Kurdish migrants on the street in specific areas of central Athens, and 
integrate them through the Kurdish pusher into the network. On the street level 
however, recruitment is rather lax trust wise. The two street-sellers providing 
information for the current study are Kurdish, who were recruited by the Kurdish 
pusher.             
 
 
3.2 Obtaining and storing smuggled cigarettes 
There are a number of ways in which the particular smuggling network obtains 
cigarettes to distribute into the black market. These involve:  
a) Stealing cigarettes from warehouse where they are stored to be introduced into 
the legal market. The stealing of cigarettes, which is performed by the 
thieves/burglars, as mentioned in the previous subsection, happens in a small 
frequency, and is certainly not the most popular way of obtaining cigarettes 
for the black market. 
b) Importation of smuggled cigarettes from Ukraine and Russia by ship. The fact 
that a large amount of cigarettes come from the former Soviet republics (and 
given that the wholesaler of this network as well as two pushers are Russian) 
shows that ethnic links and connections are commercially exploited just as in 
the case of drug trafficking.
52
 Shipped cigarettes are brought into Greece 
through Greek ports and specifically through the ports of Piraeus and 
Thessaloniki. Cigarettes are stored in containers, and may be concealed by 
other, legal merchandise. In a number of cases cigarettes are imported in 
Greece with small sea vessels via specific locations in the prefecture of Attica.  
c) Importation of smuggled cigarettes from Bulgaria by truck. There are 
however, two different ways of cigarette smuggling by truck. The first 
involves cigarettes produced in Bulgaria that are illegally forwarded to 
Greece. The second way is by Greek procurers going directly to tobacco 
companies in Greece and requesting to buy a large amount of cigarettes 
(usually a truckload) in order to export them to Bulgaria. The necessary papers 
                                                          
50
 K. von Lampe, „Criminally Exploitable Ties: A Network Approach to Organised Crime‟. In E.C. 
Viano, J. Magallanes and L. Bridel (eds) Transnational Organised Crime: Myth, Power, and Profit. 
(pp.9-22) (Durham, N.C., 2003), p.14 
51
 Coles (2001), loc. cit., p.587 
52
 See Pearson and Hobbs (2001) loc. cit.. It is also interesting to note that the packs of cigarettes the 
participants were sent from the Russian pusher in Greece, and which were smuggled in/through 
Greece, had health signs in Russian. This shows the intended market of introduction and distribution. 
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are issues, the truck gets out of Greece and returns back to Greece supposedly 
without merchandise. The smuggled cigarettes are then sold to the 
„wholesaler‟ of the smuggling network described in this paper, and through the 
pushers are brought into the market. Needless to say corrupt public official 
and specifically customs officers tend to be involved in the whole process. 
According to the participants, the major brands obtained in the above ways by the 
smuggling network presented in this study include the Greek Assos Filtre, Assos 
International and Karelia, and Pall Mall, Silk Cut, Winston and the most popular 
brand, Marlboro. Rather uncommonly some unknown Russian/Soviet brands were 
also obtained. Large quantities of cigarettes are stored by the network, as mentioned 
earlier, in houses, rooms or other storing spaces rented by the pushers (or by Greeks 
linked to the pushers). Quantities of about 1-2 boxes (50-100 cartons/500-1000 packs 
of cigarettes) are also stored in shops (of any type) owned primarily by Greeks in and 
around the area of street-selling. These shops constitute, as mentioned earlier, a point 
for quick „refuelling‟ for the street-sellers known to the shop owner.   
 
 
3.3 Distributing the Smuggled Cigarettes 
Just as with other illicit markets there is an open and a closed market. Open 
markets are those formed on the street (and other public places such as squares), 
where the street-seller awaits to be approached by customers or approaches 
prospective customers. Contrary to some illicit markets that take place out of sight of 
the general public, cigarette smuggling is in some places highly observable. For 
instance, in the central business district of Athens it is not uncommon for the passers-
by to observe street-sellers and be approached by them.  
The second form of this illicit market is the hidden, closed market, which does 
not take place on the street, and is basically arranged by the pusher or the street-seller 
and the customer. The customers however, in contrast to the open market, have to be 
already introduced, either by another pusher or by an established and trusted 
customer. 
 
“…no one goes alone [to buy cigarettes in the closed market]… they all go with 
someone who has already bought cigarettes…” 
 
„Good‟ and trusted customers many times are aware of the places in which large 
quantities (e.g. houses, rooms, storing places etc.) or medium quantities (e.g., shops 
around the area of street selling) of smuggled cigarettes are kept. Sometimes the 
customers in the closed market may even be introduced by a street-seller. As the 
Kurdish pusher interviewed noted: 
 
“On the street…when a Kurdish guy [street-seller] is approached by a customer, who 
says „I want 100 cartons‟ … he brings the customer to me”. 
  
Rather surprisingly, no great caution is taken in such cases. In contrast to the open 
market that, as mentioned earlier, is based on specific geographic areas of the city, the 
closed market most of the times operate in a variety of areas. There are instances, for 
example, in which a pusher will supply customers who need large quantities of 
cigarettes, and who live in various areas in the greater Athens area. For a few known 
and good customers selling may even take place by telephone order. According to 
information obtained by the participants, every pusher sells (either in the closed or in 
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the open market through the street-sellers or not) 15 boxes of cigarettes (750 
cartons/7,500 packs) on average every day. Each box, which is bought EURO 350 
(about £ 242/US$ 422) by the pusher, is sold for about EURO 550 (about £ 380/US$ 
663). Each pack of cigarettes, especially from the popular brands, is usually sold half 
the price of a pack sold in the legal market.  
 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this article was to describe a cigarette smuggling network in Greece. It is 
likely that similar networks exist, which may be connected to the network presented in 
this study in a variety of ways. In this research it is identified that: 
 There are specific duties/roles in the particular cigarette smuggling network. 
 Each „actor‟ of the network is tied to other „actors‟ strongly or weakly. 
 The network initially evolves around the „wholesaler‟. On the middle-level 
membership is tightly restricted and depends on variety of factors such as 
contacts, previously presented „credentials‟, experience in the (cigarette 
smuggling) business and trust. On the street level however, recruitment is not 
restricted. 
 Cigarettes to be smuggled are obtained in a variety of way including stealing 
of cigarettes or importation of cigarettes from countries of the former Eastern 
bloc. In some cases cigarettes destined for the Bulgarian market may even be 
obtained from Greek tobacco companies. 
 Large quantities of cigarettes are stored by the network in houses, rooms or 
other storing places rented by the pushers or by Greek individuals linked to the 
pushers. Smaller quantities of 1-2 boxes (50-100 cartons/500-1000 packs of 
cigarettes) are also stored in legitimate shops around the area of street-selling. 
 Smuggled cigarettes are distributed in an open (street, public place) and a 
closed market. Each pusher introduces 15 boxes of smuggled cigarettes (750 
cartons/7,500 packs) in the market on average every day. 
Apart from the issues associated with the social organisation of the particular cigarette 
smuggling network there are, in the author‟s opinion, two additional important issues 
that arise from this study. The particular methodological strategy has enabled the 
author to provide an account of a cigarette smuggling network in Greece that would 
be quite different if he relied exclusively on official data and sources that “may refer 
more to contextual variables than to the nature and extent of criminal networks”53. 
The sometimes misleading accounts that official sources can provide - if they are used 
exclusively and are not backed up by additional sources of information - is 
exemplified in the case of cigarette smuggling. In the Annual Report on Organised 
Crime in Greece for 2004 the Greek Ministry of Public Order suggests that “from the 
cases that were examined it appears that Greece mainly constitutes a transit and not 
the destination country for smuggled cigarettes”54, with quantities of smuggled 
cigarettes being destined for the black markets of North European countries such as 
the United Kingdom, where the tax is high compared to other countries
55
. Although, 
Greece is indeed a transit country for smuggled cigarettes, this perception coincides 
                                                          
53
 K. von Lampe, „Making the Second Step Before the First: Assessing Organised Crime. The Case of 
Germany‟, 42 Crime, Law and Social Change, (2004), pp.227-259   
54
 MPO (2005) loc. cit., p.19 
55
 MPO (2005) loc. cit.  
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with other official perceptions relating to the link between high taxes and prevalence 
of smuggling. In addition, the research has shown that Kurdish migrants are involved 
in cigarette smuggling, although law enforcement personnel do not perceive them as 
an ethnic group involved in organised criminal activities. 
 What we also think as an important issue stemming out of this research is the 
socio-economic position of migrants/ethnic groups in Greece, and the role this plays 
in their involvement in cigarette smuggling (among other criminal activities). von 
Lampe
56
 informs us that the street-level cigarette smuggling in East Germany was 
taken over by Vietnamese guest workers, who were unemployed as a result of the 
huge industrial and economic restructuring that occurred in the early 1990s. Similarly, 
some members of the Aboriginal communities in Canada are involved in cigarette 
smuggling because the opportunities for legitimate employment are limited
57
. The 
rigid legal framework of migration in Greece since the early 1990s has created the 
fertile ground for the criminalisation of migrants, through their exclusion, their 
positioning into the margins of the Greece society, the inability to formulate social 
bonds between the migrants and the Greek society, thus creating all the necessary 
conditions for the entrance of migrants to criminal activities including the smuggling 
of cigarettes. The cigarette smuggling business offers a large number of migrants 
some employment and income. 
Hopefully, the current research that refers to a geographic context generally 
neglected by the criminological enterprise will add to the existing literature on 
cigarette smuggling in particular and organised crime in general by contributing to the 
construction of “a typology of different constellations of organised crime”58. Based on 
the findings of this study, it is recommended:  
 Research that will assist in a better understanding of the dynamics of cigarette 
smuggling and the forces that move/drive/promote/stimulate it including any 
“regulatory asymmetries”59.  
 Additional research on the social organisation of the cigarette smuggling 
business in the country. Cigarette smuggling causes – among other phenomena 
– great difficulties in the attempts to provide an analysis of smoking 
prevalence and pattern in a country, and in consequence ways of reducing 
smoking and improving health.
60
 
 Research on the role the social and economic marginalisation of migrants 
plays in the involvement of migrants in cigarette smuggling in Greece. 
Although minority ethnic groups members are not found in illegal cigarette 
markets in some contexts (e.g., the Netherlands)
61
, this is certainly the case in 
Greece.  
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